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John Dewey’s Critique of Our
“Unmodern” Philosophy
Larry A. Hickman
1 In  what  follows  I  want  to  discuss  some of  the  themes  of  John Dewey’s  “new” book
Unmodern  Philosophy  and  Modern  Philosophy,  recently  published  by  Southern  Illinois
University Press.1 The scholarly world certainly owes a debt of gratitude to Professor
Phillip Deen for his efforts to bring this volume to fruition. His careful research among
the Dewey Papers in Special Collections of Morris Library at Southern Illinois University
Carbondale led him to see what others had overlooked. He discovered more than a dozen
chapters of an incomplete manuscript whose date, the late 1930’s and early ’40s coincides
with the period during which Dewey famously lost a manuscript while returning from
Hubbards,  Nova  Scotia  to his  home  in  New  York  City.  Now  Deen  has  meticulously
collected, collated, and edited those materials, as well as providing a highly informative
introduction. He has been able to flesh out the narrative of their provenance and their
relevance  to  the  rest  of  Dewey’s  published  work  by  his  careful  reading  of  Dewey’s
correspondence from the period.
2 To put the message of Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy in a nutshell, Dewey is
keen to explain why we have never been modern and what we should be doing about that. Of
course he does not want to deny that there was progress during the transition from
medieval to modern philosophy. But he is also clear that human history,  which is of
course our cultural history, is filled with missed opportunities, stubborn resistance to
change, and fixation on old ideas long since proven threadbare and irrelevant. Here is
Deen in his introduction:
Our beliefs and institutions were developed when scarcity was a central concern,
nature was a constant source of fear, and economic production was primarily the
work  of  individuals.  The  industrial  revolution  changed  all  that  […]  Dewey
contended  that  the  underlying  beliefs  [of  modern  philosophy]  and  their
legitimization have remained rooted in a pre-modern world. Modern technoscience
does not seek correspondence to a fixed reality, but sets elements of experience in
relation  to  one  another  in  the  interest  of  improved  future  conduct.  It  is  post-
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Darwinian, rejecting fixed ends and essences and turning to context, relation, and
experiment. However, philosophers still use categories developed during the search
for the immutable – even those positivists  and realist  philosophers who believe
themselves to be truly scientific. (xxx)
3 Readers of this new volume encounter a Dewey who is more candid and less constrained
by the blue pencils of his editors than the more familiar Dewey of the 37 volumes of the
Collected Works.  His criticism on page 90 of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction,2 for
example, and his aside on page 267 about priests hearing confessions of indulgence of
libidinous imagery, are more reminiscent of the frank expressions we find in his private
correspondence.
4 In this volume we also encounter restatements of familiar ideas, now reworked, refined
and put into relation with other ideas in ways that make them once again fresh and
meaningful. Dewey’s discussion of technology in chapter ten stands out in this regard, as
do his remarks on the quest for certainty and the epistemology industry, the relationship
between theory and practice, the continuity between humans and the rest of nature, and
the reductive nature of traditional ethical theories.
5 Dewey also plays repeated variations on the theme of his well-known 1896 essay The
Reflex Arc Concept  in  Psychology.  This book in fact  brims with references to the reflex
article.  Dewey’s  treatment  of  the  reflex  arc  has  its  roots  in  the  organic,  in  the
physiological, in a genetic account of inquiry. Wariness in non-human animals prefigures
awareness in human beings. In the relation of organism with what is relatively external
to it, we get separation of stimulus and response only on reflection or analysis. Stimulus
is analyzed as a condition of the organism into an environing situation and response is
analyzed as preparation for further environmental engagement. The key concepts of this
narrative are organism and environment, context and continuity.
6 These concepts, organism and environment, context and continuity are Darwinian, and
they are keys to what is missing in the modernist project. Dewey’s discussion of these
concepts  and  how  the  “medieval  synthesis”  prevented  completion  of  the  project  of
modernity  authenticates  yet  again  his  place  as  dialogue  partner  with  contemporary
philosophers such as Bruno Latour, who has famously (also) claimed that “We have never
been modern.” Latour’s remark echoes a claim that is central to this new Dewey volume:
our culture continues to honor an ingrained substance-accident ontology that seeks the
essential nature of things; it honors a soul/body or mind/body split that retards scientific
and social  progress;  and it  clings  tenaciously  to  notions of  certainty that  have their
origins in classical and medieval thought and that have no place in our technoscientific
milieu.  Worse,  contemporary  philosophers  continue  to  be  major  consumers  and
disseminators of these stagnant and counterproductive ideas.
7 As Dewey put the matter in a letter to Christine Chisholm Frost in 1941, “many of the
fundamental ideas of the old synthesis were not discarded but were carried over into the
systems that attempt new philosophical  formulations,  and thereby has prevented the
development of a synthesis which actually corresponds to the vital conditions and forces
of the present” (Dewey to Frost, 1941.01.23, 13074).3
8 The problem, as Deen succinctly glosses it, was that “Just as science was making rapid
advances in the attainment of knowledge, philosophy was asking whether knowledge was
possible at all” (xxii). In short, one of the most important of the features, and failures, of
modernity was its preoccupation with the problem of doubt, or skepticism. Mainstream
philosophy  has  never  been  modern  because  it  is  still  wrestling  with  this  question,
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whereas the technosciences have long since dismissed the quest for certainty in lieu of a
quest for the production of what is warranted and assertible.
9 The failure of modernity (the reason why “we have never been modern”) is thus due to a
series  of  bad  choices:  doubt  and  skepticism  over  experimentalism;  substance  over
process;  structure  over  function;  intuition  and  revelation  over  cosmological  and
methodological naturalism; the soliloquy of an individual, internal consciousness over
the observable behavior of social inquiry; preference for a mind/ body split over organic
holism and acceptance of mind as “extended and embodied”; ruptures over continuity;
the  unexamined  values  of  custom  over  those  that  have  been  evaluated  in  relevant
contexts; and studied and proud ignorance of context, especially in the field of inquiry.
Each of these failures can be characterized as a failure of nerve: on one side of the coin of
modernity we find the problem of skepticism; on its obverse, the quest for certainty.
10 If  you think this  claim questionable  or  gratuitous,  then I  invite  you to  consider  the
following data from the Philosophers Index. From 1943 to 2012 the number of essays and
reviews in English with “skepticism” in the title was 2087. Lest you think it is unfair to go
back 69 years to 1943, it  is worth noting that interest in the problem seems to have
increased, rather than diminished. More than half, or 1136 of those titles are from the 12
years since 2000. There are doubtless other essays and reviews that concern skepticism
but do not use the word in the title, and it is also possible that some of these essays attack
or dismiss the problem of skepticism. The point is that the concept is still  front and
center in philosophical journals.
11 But if the answer to our current situation does not lie in accepting the failed project of
modernity, then neither does it lie in the central claims of what some have termed post-
modernism.  Emphasis  on  deferral  and  difference  merely  identifies  the  skeptical
symptoms; it does not provide a prescription. Deferral and difference amount to little
more than skepticism on a diet. Emphasis of one side, the skeptical side, of the modernist
coin does not constitute an alternative to the failed modern project. And despite the fact
that there are still philosophers ready and eager to spend that coin, I suggest that its
value has been rendered null by the pragmatist critique of modernity. Pragmatism is not
concerned with global doubt, or with whether there are atomic sense data, or with the
conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Pragmatists take knowledge available from
work done by the technosciences seriously and they are comfortable with what they are
intellectually entitled to believe. Just as experimentalism, fallibilism and assertion with
warrant are among the tools that have made the technosciences successful, so are they
the tools that pragmatists bring to problems of evaluating and therefore knowing. The
type  of  intelligence  that  invents  the  telephone,  Dewey  tells  us,  is  the  same type  of
intelligence that is called upon when the times call for the invention of tools to address
novel and pressing moral situations.
12 Of course it should also be acknowledged that doubt is important as an aspect of the
experimental methods that pragmatists hold in such high regard. But pragmatic doubt is
not the global doubt of Descartes, nor is it the false doubt of the “thought experiments”
that are popular among some writers of essays on ethics.  I  mean the so-called moral
dilemmas that  often involve  lifeboats,  trolleys,  or  tunnels,  pitting  the  rescue  of  one
person against the lives of many others.4 If Cartesian doubt is too wide, the doubt of these
“trolly problems” is too narrow: as Allen Wood has argued so perceptively, context has
been stipulated out of the assignment. There is no continuity with the real world in which
we live.  Doubt has become so focused as to become meaningless.  Pragmatic doubt is
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always doubt in medias res. It is contexted doubt. It is present on those occasions when
continuity breaks down. It is the doubt of problem formation and testing.
13 Pragmatic  doubt  is  thus  neither  the  inflationary  doubt  of  the  Cartesians,  nor  the
deflationary “trolley problem” doubt of analytic ethics. Nor is it ethereal “skepticism-on-
a-diet” doubt by deferral and difference that is popular in some precincts of so-called
postmodernism.
14 It should have by now become apparent, I think, that what is called for in our current
situation is a productive pragmatism that both recognizes and avoids the errors of the
modern  project  at  the  same  time  that  it  avoids  the  mistakes  of  the  so-called
postmodernist  project.  I  have termed this  type of  pragmatism “post-postmodernism”
because it both anticipated what is serviceable in post-modernism, such as its rejection of
grand narratives, foundationalism, essentialism, and so on, and at the same time it avoids
the core difficulties of that project. Dewey urged us to accept an evolutionary naturalism
that accepts the fact that there is community and commonality within human experience,
that inquiry is always inquiry in context, and that it is possible to have beliefs that are
both warranted and assertible.5
15 Yes, these themes have been well and often articulated. What I am suggesting, however, is
that even though we pragmatists may know why the modern project failed and even
though we pragmatists may know what to do about it, how to address the matter in our
classes,  our  research,  and our  roles  as  public  intellectuals  –  as  writers  of  blogs  and
columns in newspapers and journals of opinion – there are still those who do not seem to
have gotten the memo, who are both oblivious of the failure of the modern project and
who are among those well known philosophers to whom the reading public looks for
articulation of what philosophy is and what it does. This unfortunate situation, I suggest,
could be addressed by utilizing some of the newly sharpened tools that Dewey provides in
Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy.
16 There are, for example, prominent philosophers who continue to work in the modernist
mode.  One  example  of  such  persistence  is  ready  to  hand  in  the  work  of  British
philosopher Derek Parfit. Parfit’s recently published two volume work On What Matters
attempts to take us back to a time when it was thought that there were “non-natural
facts.” Here is Allan Gibbard reviewing Parfit’s book in a recent issue of the London Review
of Books:
Parfit’s theory of what reasons are is a form of non-naturalism. That there is reason
not to torment oneself or others isn’t a natural fact: it is not, that is to say, the sort
of  fact  we  can  confirm  by  observation,  as  we  can  with  the  facts  of  physics  or
psychology. If something is a reason, that’s a fact, a fact that is not purely natural.
Parfit holds that most fundamentally we know about them by intuition.6
17 Continuing,  Gibbard writes,  “Parfit  cites mathematics.  Pure mathematics,  too,  is  non-
natural and known by pure thinking, not by observation. Ultimately, it is by intuition that
we know what must hold mathematically.” Again: “Parfit reports that Bernard Williams
seemed genuinely not to understand such claims, but he thinks that may be because
Williams lacked a concept that the rest of us have.” How do we know a non-natural fact?
“When we ‘see,’ as it were, that a mathematical claim must be true, we are ‘responding in
non-causal ways to the validity of some kinds of reasoning’.” “If  there were no non-
natural properties, Parfit tells us at one point in a tone of despair, then nothing would
matter. For something to matter, after all, is for there to be reason to care about it, and
facts  about  reasons  are  non-natural.”  To  his  credit,  Gibbard  rejects  Parfit’s  non-
John Dewey’s Critique of Our “Unmodern” Philosophy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-1 | 2013
4
naturalism. “If no properties are non-natural, what follows is an either/or: either nothing
matters or Parfit is wrong that mattering is non-natural. Now it seems beyond doubt that
things matter, whereas we needn’t wholly trust in Parfit’s metatheory of mattering.”
18 Parfit’s non-naturalism appears to be yet one more example of how we have never been
modern. His attempts to bring together elements of Kant’s ethics and the work of the
Utilitarians are supported by the contextless doubt – the deflationary doubt – of “trolley
problems,”  and  he  has  chosen  intuition  and  revelation  over  cosmological  and
methodological  naturalism.  He  has  decontextualized  and  reified  facts,  rather  than
treating them as “facts of a case,” as Dewey would have us do.
19 Dewey’s  remarks  in  the  closing pages  of  Human Nature  and  Conduct  could  have  been
written with Parfit in mind.
The reason [that the very meaning of the general  notions of moral inquiry is  a
matter of doubt and dispute] is that these notions are discussed in isolation from
the  concrete  facts  of  the  interactions  of  human  beings  with  one  another  –  an
abstraction as fatal as was the old discussion of phlogiston, gravity and vital force
apart from concrete correlations of changing events with one another. (MW14.222)7
20 And as Murray Murphy succinctly put the matter
Dewey will admit no transcendental realm of ideals, no division of the moral from
the  natural,  no  nonsense  about  cognitive  versus  emotive  meaning.  Action  is
’conduct’ because it is morally appraised, controlled, and guided, not from above,
but from within the natural world. (MW.14.xv)
21 But  that  is  probably  enough about  how things  have  gone  wrong.  I  said  earlier  that
Unmodern  Philosophy  and  Modern  Philosophy  provides  some  newly  sharpened  tools  to
address this problem. The one I want to emphasize is his claim that if knowing is treated
as a mode of technology then we finally can get past problems that have prevented us
from being modern. This is a strong claim and it puts technology at the center of his
program of resolving the difficulties that philosophy has inherited.
22 Possibly tired of defending his use of the term “instrumental” (although I suppose that it
is worth repeating once again that Dewey’s instrumentalism has little to do with Zweck-
rationalität, the bête noir of the Frankfurt School) Dewey points out that any word can be
misunderstood  and  then  he  carries  on,  introducing  expanded,  more  finely  tuned
meanings of technology than appear elsewhere in his work. He also offers an excellent
definition  of  the  term  “instrumental.”  He  has  used  it,  he  says,  to  “designate  the
intermediate position and function of the subject matter of knowledge in the inclusive
complex  of  the  transaction constituting  human living  as  a  going concern”  (242).  He
reports  his  fears  that  the  term  “technology”  will  meet  the  same  fate  as  has
“instrumental.”
23 He tells us that the role or task of philosophy is to help bring to light or formulate the
needs and obstructions that constitute the practical problems and resources which, if
they were systematically used, would further their resolution” and that anything that
does this is  ipso facto philosophical.  He develops two senses of technology.  It  may be
helpful to compare this with an earlier statement that was his most succinct up to that
point. It comes from What I Believe (1930):
’Technology’ signifies all the intelligent techniques by which the energies of nature
and man are directed and used in satisfaction of human needs; it cannot be limited
to a few outer and comparatively mechanical forms. In the face of its possibilities,
the traditional conception of experience is obsolete. (LW.5.270)
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24 This is a strong and remarkable statement, since it says that technology is by its very
nature intelligent and that its use should be expanded. As such, it runs directly counter to
contemporary treatments of technology by Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas, and Frankfurt
School figures Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. It should be said, parenthetically,
that philosophers of technology who are our contemporaries have moved perceptibly in
Dewey’s direction. These would include Don Ihde, Andrew Feenberg, Peter-Paul Verbeek,
and others.
25 As remarkable as were Dewey’s remarks on technology in What I Believe, his remarks in
this volume are both more specific and even more remarkable. What Dewey terms “wide”
technology  is  knowledge  producing  more  knowledge  in  systematic  ways.  “Narrow”
technology,  on the other  hand,  includes those technologies  now called such,  that  is,
technology as employed in the various disciplines. Wide technology ideally guides narrow
technology, but is also informed by such practices.
26 What has this  to  do with philosophy? Knowledge,  Dewey writes,  “is,  first,  a  form of
technology in the methods it employs in producing more knowledge and improving its
own  methods  and,  furthermore,  is  capable  of  being  a  technology  in  humane  social
guidance of technologies now called such but whose human and social consequences are
left a matter of pulling and hauling of conflicting customs and institutions which are
hardly touched by effective use of the method of intelligence at work” (244).
27 Wide  technology  is  what  allows  philosophy  to  serve,  ideally,  as  what  Dewey  called
“liaison” among the various disciplines. Admittedly, terminology can be confusing. In my
own earlier attempts to understand Dewey’s take on technology I have used the term
“technology” to refer to what he here terms “wide” technology, and I have used the term
“techniques” to refer to “narrow” technology.
28 Dewey takes issue with the claim that “technology is indifferent to the uses to which it is
put.” “As long as that statement remains as true as it is at the present time,” he writes, “it
signifies that something else is sure to decide the uses to which it is put – traditions and
customs, rules of business and of law – which exist now because they came into existence
in the past, superficially sugared over by moralistic condemnations and exhortations”
(244). In other words, one of the reasons we have never been modern is that we have not
trusted technology in both senses of the term, wide and narrow. We have repeated the
mistakes of the Athenian Greeks. We have benefitted from technical advances, but we
have failed to place them in the proper contexts, to see the types of values that they
involve and the types of choices that they offer, and we have just relegated them to the
realm of the “material” as opposed to the “spiritual.”
29 So Dewey identifies knowing as one form of technological art. He references his 1916 logic
here, drawing analogies between the role of crude ores, intermediate stock parts, tools,
and finished products in industry and the role of raw materials, intermediate parts, tools,
and  products  of  sequences  of  inquiry.  He  undercuts  the  traditional  problem  of
appearance and reality by recasting it as a relationship between the raw (or crude) and
the finished (or refined). Metaphors of arts, crafts, and industry dominate chapters 10
and 11 of this work.
30 Here is Dewey in what is perhaps the clearest statement in his entire published corpus
regarding the relation between the two types of technology:
What has been said should protect the view that scientific inquiry is one form or
type  of  technological  art  from  being  assimilated  to  the  specific  content  of
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technologies already familiarly so designated –although it is highly probable that
the association of knowing with “mind” and of technology with industries carried
on  for  pecuniary  profit  will  cause  some  persons  to  indulge  in  continued
identification  of  the  position  here  taken  with  the  doctrine  that  knowledge  is
subordinated to gaining some fixed ‘practical’ end of a private or ‘personal’ sort.
(246)
31 Of note here is the connection he makes between technology and mind. It is significant, I
think, that he presents his clearest statements about technology in a chapter on mind and
body:  wider technology involves systematic  attempts to develop new tools,  including
those that are conceptual, for the resolution of the problems of organic beings whose
minds are both embodied and extended.
32 Lest there be any doubt about the “primary concern” of his discussion up to this point,
Dewey makes it clear enough on page 249. It is the task of outlining the grounds upon
which  scientific  knowing  should  be  regarded  as  a  form  of  technology.  Whereas
epistemology tries to treat transactions wholesale, absent proper context, technological
undertakings start from need, and they are instrumental and not yet final. The point is
production of means of satisfaction of objective conditions.
33 Now there may be those, and in fact there have been those, who have suggested that the
pragmatic criticism of the modernist project is altogether too negative in tone. There is
anti-foundationalism,  anti-essentialism,  anti-reductionism,  anti-spectator  view  of
knowledge, anti-mind/body dualism, anti, anti, anti. To those critics I would suggest, with
Dewey, that criticism of ideas that retard growth and development of inquiry is itself a
positive project. We do not fault those engineers who inspect bridges and other aspects of
our  infrastructure  for  cracks  and  faults:  we  instead  offer  them  our  support  and
encouragement.
34 What Dewey has given us in Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, with the generous
editorship of Philip Deen, is an account of how and why we have never been modern. He
has  illuminated  the  bad  choices  made  along  the  way:  doubt  and  skepticism  over
experimentalism;  substance  over  process;  structure  over  function;  intuition  and
revelation  over  cosmological  and  methodological  naturalism;  the  soliloquy  of an
individual,  internal  consciousness  over  the  observable  behavior  of  social  inquiry;
preference  for  a  mind/body  split  over  organic  holism  and  acceptance  of  mind  as
“extended and embodied”; ruptures over continuity; received values over those that have
been  evaluated  in  relevant  contexts;  and  studied  and  proud  ignorance  of  context,
especially in the field of inquiry. He has called upon philosophers and others alike to treat
knowing as a mode of technology because it is “the one form of technology which directly
and  systematically  stimulates  and  promotes  production  of  consequences,  uses  and
enjoyments which constitute departures from previous conditions and even breaks in
customary ways of doing things” (251).
35 In short, it is possible to heal the split between fact and value, knowing and evaluation.
Dewey challenges us to imagine that the genuinely modern can be brought into existence.
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NOTES
1. John Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, edited by Phillip Dean (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 2012).
2. In a note on page 90 Dewey professes to find it ironic that “the so-called phenomenological
school now flourishing” claims that “the way to obtain a ‘scientific’ philosophy, binding on all
thinkers, is to forget everything that is scientific including its method of inquiry, and make a
‘subjectivistic’  or  Cartesian approach,  starting  from the  ‘pure  consciousness  of  an individual
knower’.”
3. The  Correspondence  of  John  Dewey,  1871-1952,  Larry  A. Hickman,  General  Editor;  Volume 1:
1871-1918,  fourth  edition;  Volume  2:  1919-1939,  third  edition;  Volume  3:  1940-1952,  second
edition; Volume 4: 1953-2008, first edition. Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corporation, 2008.
4. Allan Wood has launched a brilliant assault on these false doubts in his response to Derek
Parfit’s On What Matters. See D. Parfit, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, vol.
2, pp. 66-82.
5. Jim Garrison has drawn my attention to a very interesting passage in Derrida’s Grammatology,
in which he discusses the semiotic Theory of Charles S. Peirce. Derrida apparently misses Peirce’s
point that sign-interpretation need not go on ad infinitum. See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology,
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976, 49.
6. Allan Gibbard, “Five Girls on a Rock,” a review of On What Matters by Derek Parfit, London Review
of Books, 7 June 2012, 23.
7. References to John Dewey’s published works are to the critical (print) edition, The Collected
Works of John Dewey 1882-1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1967-1991, and published in three series as The Early Works: 1882-1898, The
Middle Works: 1898-1924, and The Later Works, 1925-1953. These designations are followed by volume
and page number. In order to insure uniform citations of the standard edition, the pagination of
the print edition has been preserved in The Collected Works of John Dewey 1882-1953: The Electronic
Edition, edited by Larry A. Hickman, Charlottesville, Virginia: InteLex Corp., 1996.
8. This is a play on Dewey’s remark in the introduction to the 1948 edition of Reconstruction in
Philosophy. “The genuinely modern has still to be brought into existence” (MW 12.273).
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